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INTEREST RATE RESTRICTIONS IN A NATURAL
EXPERIMENT: LOAN ALLOCATION AND THE CHANGE IN
THE USURY LAWS IN 1714*
Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth
This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British govern-
ment tightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to
5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan size
increased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralised
credits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role of
prominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets signiﬁcantly; we ﬁnd
no evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.
Almost since the beginning of recorded history, usury restrictions have been widely
used. The laws of Hammurabi from the 2nd millennium bc regulated interest rates, as
did the Old Testament and the Catholic Church. While early rules often outlawed the
taking of interest altogether, later restrictions stipulated maximum permissible interest
rates. To the present day, many developing and Islamic countries and US states impose
limits on private loan contracts to stamp out predatory lending by credit sharks; only
recently Italy re-introduced a law against usurious credit contracts (Glaeser and Sche-
inkman, 1998; Blitz and Long, 1965; Homer and Sylla, 1996).
The effects of usury regulation have remained controversial. Numerous scholars have
argued that they had damaging consequences and that this conclusion applies to both
the prohibition of interest as well as to limitations on maximum rates. Max Weber
famously argued that the Catholic Church’s restrictions on interest slowed capital accu-
mulation and growth (Weber, 1998; Tawney, 1926). Ekelund et al. (1989) examine
medieval restrictions on maximum interest rates, arguing that lower interest rates served
to extract rents from lenders. Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998), on the other hand, argue
that usury laws act as a form of insurance that transfers resources from states of the world
where themarginal utility of incomeis low (when households are well-off) to states when
it is high (after negative income shocks etc.). They show that usury restrictions can be
Pareto-improving if income shocks are mainly temporary and idiosyncratic.
This study exploits a unique dataset of hundreds of eighteenth-century loan trans-
actions, collected from the archives of Hoare’s, a private London bank.
1 These records
contain detailed evidence on loan rates, amounts lent and the identity of borrowers.
* We thank the partnership of Hoare’s Bank for kindly permitting access to their archives, and Victoria
Hutchings and Barbara Sands for help with the ledgers. Seminar participants at the 2005 CEPR-Bank of Italy
conference and at the Max-Planck-Institute in Bonn kindly offered advice. Fabio Braggion, Christoph Engel,
Yadira Gonzalez de Lara, Martin Hellwig, Colin Mayer and Isabel Schnabel made helpful suggestions. We
thank Abhijit Banerjee for inspiring our work on this topic and Andrew Scott as well as two anonymous
referees for their comments. Research support by the Leverhulme Trust, by the Centre de Recerca en
Economia Internacional (CREI) and CREA is acknowledged.
1 This is the only London bank of the period with archives complete enough to evaluate the effects of the
usury law.
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[ 743 ]When the English government changed the usury rate in 1714, Hoare’s Bank drastically
altered its loan allocation policy. The minimum loan size increased sharply after the
reduction in the usury limit, in line with the predictions of a view of lending behaviour
as proﬁt maximisation with ﬁxed costs rather than as providing social insurance. Dis-
crimination in favour of wealthy and well-connected borrowers increased, suggesting
that the bank sharply reduced the risk proﬁle of its lending activity. This implies that
the usury laws in England provided little if any insurance and instead acted as a means
of rent extraction. We also document a retreat into collateralised borrowing after the
change in the usury law, in line with predictions. In combination, these ﬁndings sug-
gest that small changes in government regulation of credit transactions can have drastic
effects on loan allocations and that usury laws are not social insurance.
Few previous studies have examined the effects of the usury laws empirically based on
micro-data. Alessie et al. (2001) study the introduction of legal maxima on interest rates
for consumer credit in Italy in 1996. These rates were set at 1.5 times average rates on
similar transactions. The authors ﬁnd that credit allocation did not change markedly –
rejection rates stayed broadly constant after the change in the law. Empirical studies
have been rare partly because economic historians traditionally believed that usury laws
were ignored in practice. Yet there is growing evidence that, at least in some countries
and periods, they were strictly enforced. Evasion was difﬁcult and rare (Rockoff, 2003;
Tan, 2001). Practical difﬁculties in tracing the usury laws effects abound. Conclusive
studies require micro-evidence, which is hard to ﬁnd for most of the relevant historical
periods.
2 While regulations remain unchanged, it is difﬁcult to determine how lending
decisions would have been made in the absence of constraints. This is why our study of
a change in the usury law’s provisions offers a unique opportunity to study their impact.
Other related literature includes work on ﬁnancial repression and the interaction of
ﬁnance and growth. Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) argued that the quality of
ﬁnancial services was as important as quantity. Demetriades and Luintel (1996) and
Dickson (1997) analysed ﬁnancial conditions and aggregate time-series evidence for
India, arguing that ﬁnancial regulations retarded economic growth on the subcontin-
ent. Fry (1997) summarised the experiences with restrictions in several countries. A
recent literature using growth regressions has highlighted the importance of ﬁnance for
growth (Levine, 1997; King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rousseau and
Sylla, 2003). Paradoxically, however, the consensus view is that ﬁnance did not matter
for the British Industrial Revolution (Mokyr, 1999; Neal, 1994). Before 1850 few
enterprisesreceived outside ﬁnancing.Our results can provide a partial explanation why
lending to enterprises was rare at that time: regulatory intervention may have stood in
the way. If so, the benign effects of the Glorious Revolution, emphasised by North and
Weingast (1989), may need to be counted against some of the countervailing effects of
ﬁnancial repression.
Weproceedasfollows.ThenextSectionplacesthechangeintheEnglishusurylawin1714
in its historical context and describes how our dataset was constructed. Section 2 derives
testable implications from a basic model of lending behaviour, and Section 3 presents our
mainempiricalresultsaswellaspossibleobjections.Finally,theconclusionsummariseswhat
can and cannot be inferred from a case study of lending behaviour at one bank.
2 Existing historical studies do not analyse the economic impact in any detail (Shatzmiller, 1990).
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In this Section, we give a brief overview of the legal context of the natural experiment
that we exploit. We explain the origin of our data and the way it was collected, and
provide a summary of some key characteristics.
1.1. Usury Laws in England
Before 1545, lending at interest was outlawed (except for Jews). Henry III set a maxi-
mum rate of two pence per pound per week (54% annual) lending by Jews. From 1545
to 1552, a maximum rate of 10% applied to all transactions. Under Queen Mary, the
taking of interest was once more outlawed. It was reinstituted in 1571 at the old
maximum, which was lowered to 8% under James I, to 6% in 1660, and to 5% in 1714.
The change in the law applied from the end of September. Throughout, punishment
for transgressions was severe; the standard penalty for usurious contracts was forfeiture
of three times the principal and interest (Rockoff, 2003).
3 Probably, the Hanoverian
government used the coming of peace after the end of the Wars of the Spanish Suc-
cession to force through permanently lower borrowing rates, allowing it privileged
access to the sinews of power (Brewer, 1989).
The ﬁnal period of usury laws in England began with Jeremy Bentham’s Defence of
Usury. He argued that mutually beneﬁcial transactions between adults should be
allowed, and that the usury laws often forced borrowers into the arms of loan-sharks
(Rockoff, 2003). Adam Smith, on the other hand, saw the usury laws as a potential
blessing and as an actual one in England. In his view, maximum rates had followed
market rates. Anticipating arguments about adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981),
he argued that interest rate limits in private loan transactions ensured that honest
borrowers could obtain loans, while keeping fraudsters out of the credit market:
The legal rate ...though it ought to be somewhat above, ought not to be much
above the lowest market rate. If the legal rate of interest ...was ﬁxed so high as
eight or ten per cent, the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would
be lent to prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing to give this high
interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a part
of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into the
competition. A great part of the capital of the country would thus be kept out
of the hands which were most likely to make a proﬁtable and advantageous use
of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to waste and destroy it.
Where the legal rate of interest ... is ﬁxed but a very little above the lowest
market rate, sober people are universally preferred, as borrowers, to prodigals
and projectors.
4
Eventually, the liberal argument won. In 1833, usury limits were lifted for bills of
exchange and were ﬁnally abolished altogether in 1854.
3 From 29th Sept. 1714 Interest upon Loan of Money, &, at above the Rate of 5l. per Cent per Ann. not to
be taken. 13 Anne c. 15. The Statutes of the Realm: printed by command of His Majesty King George the Third
(London: Dawson’s, 1963), vol. 9, p. 928.
4 Smith (1982 [1776]).
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Our data come from Hoare’s Bank, founded by Sir Richard Hoare in the late seven-
teenth century. Originally a goldsmith, he shed this side of the business in the 1690s.
Hoare’s remains a private bank in Fleet Street to the present day. The representa-
tiveness of our data is difﬁcult to establish. Compared to a giant, state-backed institu-
tion like the Bank of England, Hoare’s was probably much more typical of the large
number of banks operating in the West in the early century. It was part of a small
pioneering group of institutions that acted as credit intermediaries, taking deposits and
making loans to a larger group of clients than earlier merchant banks.
5 By 1725, it has
been estimated that there were 24 banks in the London West End. Where we have
points of comparison for banking practices elsewhere – from record keeping to interest
calculations at Child’s Bank, for example, or contemporary handbooks – we ﬁnd many
similarities (Cooper, 1740; Quinn, 2001).
Survivorship bias could imply that our data are highly unrepresentative. In the
absence of comprehensive banking statistics, this cannot be examined much further.
Yet the very fact that Hoare’s was not particularly proﬁtable during the years we examine
should reduce any potential survivorship bias (Temin and Voth, 2003). It took many
more years for the business to be ﬁrmly established. Between 1702 and 1725, the bank’s
assets varied between £100,000 and £200,000.
6 Steady growth only set in after 1730.
We use data on 877 loan transactions, involving 542 different clients. For each loan,
we can determine the total amount lent, the duration of the loan, the interest paid, the
type and value of collateral offered, as well as the name of the client. Hoare’s Bank kept
loan registers in the form of double entry ledgers. Against the date of the transaction,
debits were entered on the left and credits on the right. The register also contains the
title of the borrower, and tracks relevant changes in status closely. In most cases, the
clerk noted the collateral offered for a new loan. He occasionally put down the con-
tracted loan rate but we need to calculate the interest rate from the payment streams in
most cases. Hoare’s bank did not use compound interest, in line with contemporary
handbooks on how to calculate interest for loans (Cooper, 1740).
Names of Hoare’s customers were checked against a variety of sources to establish
their identity and to analyse their position in Hanoverian England. A substantial pro-
portion of large borrowers can be matched against entries in the Dictionary of National
Biography (DNB) and Cokayne’s Complete Peerage. Borrowers were frequently noblemen,
ofﬁcers, church ofﬁcials and wealthy traders; Hoare’s clients clearly were not repres-
entative of the English population as a whole.
We plot the median interest rate on loans made by Hoare’s over this period in
Figure 1. The graph suggests that Hoare’s bank strictly adhered to the usury limits. We
checked if there were offsetting deposits by borrowers; there were none. There is no
evidence that the bank used this possible trick to bypass the regulation, or that cus-
tomers paid an up-front fee.
7 The median interest rate on new loan transactions
dropped from almost exactly 6% before 1714 to 5% after the change in the limit. The
overall degree of compliance is impressive – if the bank did evade the usury laws, it left
5 Kashyap et al. (1999) explore the synergy between there two activities.
6 £150,000 in 1720 is worth about £18,500,000 in goods today (Ofﬁcer, 2008).
7 The bank’s annual proﬁt calculation also strongly suggests that Hoare’s complied with the usury laws.
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usury restrictions more generally, the enforcement of interest rate limits in eighteenth-
century England was probably effective and widespread (Homer and Sylla, 1996).
Figure 1 also shows that the loan market did not balance through interest rate changes;
92% of loans were made at the usury limit. Instead, credit rationing must have been the
primary allocation mechanism. This unfortunately also means that we cannot learn
much from analysing loans made below the usury limit.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the loan dataset. Median loan value was just
over £200 but differences between small and large transactions could be considerable –
the Gini coefﬁcient on loan size is 0.72. The maximum loan was for a massive £27,290.
Average loan duration was quite short (a median of 281 days). This means that the
change in the permitted interest rate affected the bank’s loan book quickly. Loan
duration could be as short as one day and as long as 38 years. Almost half of all loans
were against collateral, of which 4% were against mortgages and another 7% against
securities. Members of the aristocracy accounted for 13% of all transactions and those
of minor nobility for another 15%.
2. Hypotheses
We focus on changes in lending behaviour after 1714. A common view is that changes
in the usury law should have had only minimal effects. If regulations were widely
circumvented, there should be no signiﬁcant shift in lending behaviour. This is what we
would also expect if the lowering of the interest rate ceiling was a reﬂection of lower
market interest rates.
8 A second possibility is based on the predictions by Glaeser and
Scheinkman (1998). They see usury regulations as a form of social engineering that
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum N
Loan characteristics
loan amount – £ 775.01 201.7 1741.72 5 27290 877
Duration – days 884.06 281 1511.89 1 14007 853
Interest rate – % 3.85* 5 2.49 0 7** 877
Type of collateral
Any 0.42 0 0.50 0 1 877
Mortgage 0.04 0 0.20 0 1 877
Securities 0.07 0 0.25 0 1 877
Borrower characteristics
Aristocracy 0.13 0 0.34 0 1 876
Minor 0.15 0 0.36 0 1 876
Known 0.15 0 0.35 0 1 877
Female 0.11 0 0.31 0 1 877
Note. *including loans at zero interest
**short loan, interest rate calculated from cash ﬂows; intended interest rate was probably 6%.
8 We have examined the question of possible violations of the usury laws elsewhere (Temin and Voth, 2003).
We essentially ﬁnd that had Hoare’s lent at rates higher than the permitted maximum, we cannot square loan
revenues and proﬁts as reported on the balance sheets. Also, the loans that may be considered suspicious (at
zero interest) were often given to customers who had just borrowed at the maximum usury rate.
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provided cheaper social insurance – access to credit should have widened. Third, the
classic view, embodied in the writings of Shaw and McKinnon, sees interest rate
restrictions as an impediment to the functioning of the ﬁnancial system. If this inter-
pretation is correct, then we should ﬁnd large shifts in credit allocation after 1714 –
and in a direction that potentially reduced the efﬁciency of the intermediation process
overall. We use the data from Hoare’s Bank to distinguish between these views.
The three competing interpretations of usury limits have testable implications. In
order to do tests, we need to have a closer look at the bank’s loan allocation policy. The
market for loans, as discussed above, did not balance through changes in interest rates.
Instead, as Figure 1 illustrates, credit was habitually rationed at the maximum per-
mitted interest rate. If the usury laws acted as social insurance – in line with the Glaeser
and Scheinkman model – we should expect to ﬁnd a continuous supply of credit to less
advantaged households. Changes in the total supply of credit should be minimal –
depositors implicitly know that they will be able to borrow cheaply when they face a
negative shock. Also, since banks did not pay interest on deposits, the supply of loan-
able funds should be unaffected. In equilibrium, those that found it relatively harder to
borrow (and to show ability to repay interest and principal) before 1714 should receive
greater access to credit. Second, the minimum loan size should drop, as wider groups
of creditors can now claim insurance.
If, on the other hand, the ﬁnancial repression and rent-seeking models of usury
regulations are correct, we should expect the opposite – minimum loan size should
increase and privileged groups should borrow even more on the new, favourable
terms. Lower lending rates translate directly into lower revenue per loan made, and
commensurately lower proﬁts. In order to break even and recoup its ﬁxed costs, the
bank would need to make loans of greater minimum size. This is the ﬁrst empirical
prediction necessary to support the ﬁnancial repression interpretation. A related
argument can be made with respect to the bank’s credit allocation and the risk of
default. Clearly, the extent to which a bank can take on risk depends on the interest
rate it is permitted to charge. With a lower rate, the maximum default rate it can
tolerate will decline. This yields the second empirical implication – borrowers regarded
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Fig. 1. Median Interest Rate on Loans against Interest, Hoare’s 1702–1725
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or fully) shut out of the market. Finally, we should expect that the importance of
collateral increases as the maximum loan rate is reduced. This allows the bank to
reduce its risk in yet another way, effectively closing off access to credit by borrowers
who do not own assets equivalent to the value of the loans they seek.
3. Empirical Results
In this Section, we examine the evidence from Hoare’s loan ledgers. Table 2 presents a
summary of our main ﬁndings. We regress each of our indicator variables – the interest
rate, the size of loans, and the use of collateral – on a dummy for the changed usury law
(and a time trend, to control for other factors). While we ideally would like to use an
endogenous break-point test to demonstrate that the usury laws caused a discontinuity
relative to earlier trends, the frequency of our data does not permit this. The summary
results in Table 2 suggest that the period before and after 1714 showed markedly
different lending behaviour by Hoare’s in three key dimensions – the interest rate
charged, amounts lent, and collateral demanded. None of the changes can be
explained as a simple continuation of earlier trends. We ﬁnd that the typical interest
rate charged on a loan transaction fell sharply after 1714, and we cannot reject the null
that it changed by exactly one percentage point. This suggests a high degree of com-
pliance with the new regulation. This, in its own right, is important. It conﬁrms that, for
Hoare’s Bank at least, much of the traditional scepticism about the effectiveness of
usury regulations was misplaced. Note that there was no clear trend towards lower
interest rates. Loan volumes surged after 1714, with values increasing by 68%. Loan
values were trending up by 1.4% per year before 1714; the jump associated with the
usury laws is equivalent to 52 years of the pre-intervention trend. Finally, the per-
centage of loans collateralised jumped sharply, when it had declined for much of the
earlier period. We next examine these changes in detail.
3.1. High Status and Access to Credit
Table 3, regressions 1 and 2 look at the determinants of lending volume. Before 1714,
members of theEnglish politicaland commercialelite that were important enoughto be
Table 2
Usury Laws, Impact on Main Variables
Regression 1 2 3
Dependent variable Loan interest rate* Loan amount Collateralised lending (dummy)
Estimation method OLS OLS Probit
Usury dummy 0.84 551 0.532
(4.8) (3.32) (3.9)
Trend 0.006 4 0.02
(0.7) (1.4) (4.5)
N 671 877 877
Adj. R
2/Pseudo-R
2 0.05 0.02 0.02
Note. *for loans at an interest rate greater zero.
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either because they were wealthier, or because their social connections made it sensible
for Hoare’s to lend to them. Being traceable in either the DNB or the lists of aristocrats
(known) yielded large returns – an additional £342 (mean, 122 median).
9 Women were
offered less credit, on average, than men. After controlling for inclusion in the main
biographical dictionaries, those of noble birth (aristocracy, minor nobility, or those with
any title recorded in the ledger) did not consistently receive larger loan allocations.
10
Repeat customers also did not receive more credit. As is often the case in studies
attempting to explain loan allocation, the overall explanatory power is not high. Since
loan sizes were highly unequal, and results could have easily been inﬂuenced by outliers,
we also estimate a median regression (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). The results, shown
in Table 3, are broadly similar, and the beneﬁts of being known are conﬁrmed.
Crucially, loan allocations changed markedly after 1714. Average loan size grew from
£640 to £1,259. There is no obvious reason why loan demand should have changed so
strongly and abruptly; changes in supply are a much more likely explanation, even if we
cannot disentangle effects perfectly. Figure 2 plots the median value of loans over time,
taking the pre-1714 average as a benchmark. The number of loans in any one year was
not large, and the averages are variable. Yet before 1714, loan sizes largely stay within
the 2 standard deviation band (calculated with pre-1714 data), while trending up
gradually. After the change in the usury limit, all years show loans sizes markedly above
the upper bound of the earlier distribution.
Table 3, regressions 1 and 2 show that the increase in average loan size was not
simply the result of changes in observable customer characteristics.
11 We include an
interaction effect between being known and the new usury regulation. After 1714, the
gains from being connected became much larger. Being known under the new usury
regulation produced an additional £1,025 in credit (£624 in the median regression), on
top of the baseline advantage. The further increase in loan size for those known is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level in both regressions.
12 These results provide the conditional
mean and median of the distribution of loan size changes with the tightening of the
usury laws, assuming that these effects are linear.
Matching estimators form groups of comparable individuals, and calculate dif-
ferences between them. Borrowers receive a propensity score based on a set of
observable characteristics. We use nearest-neighbour matching, comparing a bor-
rower before 1714 with someone as similar as possible thereafter. The difference in
loan amount received becomes the basis for an estimate of the average treatment
effect of the usury laws. As the number of matches, we use either 1 or 4.
13 In
addition, we also use the kernel estimator that offers an efﬁcient combination of the
9 The result is signiﬁcant at the 90% level of conﬁdence. It is even stronger in a setup without a time trend.
10 The positive coefﬁcient for the aristocracy in the median regression suggests that outliers are responsible
for the large standard error under OLS.
11 We also examined if the year of the South Sea bubble is partly responsible for the results. Since credit
conditions were highly unusual – with a credit crunch developing in the fall – this is a real possibility. Also,
there may have been a surge of borrowing against collateral (Neal, 1990; Carswell,1993). However, re-esti-
mating Table 3 without 1720 yields virtually identical results.
12 Including a time trend or the size of the banks balance sheet to control for other factors that may have
driven changes in loan size does not inﬂuence our results in an important way.
13 As suggested by Abadie et al. (2002).
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the characteristics of borrowers, using the same set of explanatory variables as in
Table 3 as well as the attractiveness indicator and the dummy for repeat customer
status.
14 Table 4 shows the results. We ﬁnd differences between £490 and £630 be-
fore and after the usury laws, very similar to the £467 in Table 3. The effect is
signiﬁcant in all cases. The sharp increase in loan sizes offers support for our ﬁrst
empirical hypothesis.
OLS, quantile regressions and matching estimators all show that the bank reacted to
the restriction on the interest it could charge by increasing the size of loans it made, and
by cutting lending to the smallest borrowers. Discrimination in favour of highly-con-
nected individuals was one element pushing up lending volumes. Those who received
large amounts of credit before the change in the usury law continued to receive loans –
and while they paid a lower interest rate, they also received larger credits. How valuable
wasthesubsidyreceivedbyborrowersafter1714?Themedian(mean)loanvaluewas£500
Table 3
Determinants of Lending Volume and Collateral









Estimation method OLS Median regression Probit Probit
Usury 342 122 1.2 0.1
(1.7) (2.6) (6.04) (0.4)
Known 805 96 0.06 0.11
(3.93) (2.0) (0.4) (0.77)
Known  Usury 1,025 624
(2.45) (6.5)
Trend 5.5 4.8 0.07 0. 94
(0.64) (2.4) (6.2) (7.9)
Usury  Trend 0.26
(6.5)
Female 473 101 0.13 0.16
(2.4) (2.2) (0.9) (1.0)
Aristocracy 366 45 0.18 0.18
(1.7) (0.9) (1.1) (1.1)
Minor 138 94 0.36 0.33
(0.7) (2.2) (2.5) (2.3)
Repeat 202 16 0.23 0.2
(1.6) (0.5) (2.3) (2.1)
Title 57 20 0.06 0.11
(0.4) (0.6) (0.4) (0.77)
0.09 0.07
(0.8) (0.6)
Constant 629 102 0.36 0.33
(4.3) (3.0) (2.5) (2.3)
Adj. R
2/Pseudo-R
2 0.06 0.033 0.06 0.11
N 824 824 809 809
Note. Under OLS, standard errors clustered at the level of borrowers
14 We use the psmatch2 routine by Sianesi and Leuven for kernel matching, using the bootstrap routine
with 100 repetitions to estimate the standard error. For nearest-neighbour matching, we use the match
estimator by Ibid.
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was 1% (0.8%) lower, suggesting a saving of £4.3 (£21.9) for each typical loan.
The underlying assumption for all the statistical methods used so far is conditional
independence – that the error term in a regression of loan amount on borrower
characteristics is not correlated with the characteristics themselves. Yet we know that
the composition of borrowers changed. The implicit assumption – that the assignment
of borrower to the period before or after the change in the usury law was random – may
well not hold. If the bank began to discriminate more strongly against certain types of
borrowers (not just by reducing their loan allocation, but by excluding them alto-
gether), the true effect of being high-born or well-connected may well be larger than
our results so far suggest.
Our data are compatible with such an interpretation; see Table 5. We analyse all the
customers that the bank served in the period 1705–1714, and then identify those with
whom the bank continued a lending relationship after the tightening of the law.
Customers who continued to receive loans ranked markedly higher on the attractive-



























































































































Fig. 2. Hoare’s Median Lending Amounts (3-year-moving average)
Table 4












Neighbour 1 490 608
(197; 805) (324; 891)
4 496 708
(188; 805) (407; 1010)
Kernel 608 630
(332; 884) (344; 916)
Note. 95% conﬁdence interval in parentheses; estimated from bootstrap with 100 repetitions.
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markedly lower than in the pre-1714 sample as a whole, and the number of gentry is
higher. The customer proﬁle changed, possibly as a result of a deliberate effort to
attract borrowers after 1714 who resembled the preferred customers before then.
3.2. Defaults and the Use of Collateral
Risk can be reduced by selecting different customers, or by tightening collateral
requirements. Table 6 shows the use of collateral over time. With every ﬁve-year period
that passed before 1714, fewer transactions involved the posting of security. Increas-
ingly, the bank genuinely offered access to fresh funds for borrowers, instead of just
liquidity services. Immediately before 1714, only 1 out of 10 pounds lent was secured by
collateral. After 1714, the ﬁgure jumped to 67% – as high as it had been in the 1690s.
Changing incentives caused a retreat from genuine credit intermediation. Also, the
duration of loans fell abruptly after 1714, from 940 to 680 days. Borrowers could
therefore only use the proceeds of loans for the short term, reinforcing the shift from
fresh funds to liquidity services.
Simple probit estimation, with the use of collateral as a dependent variable, conﬁrms
this (Table 3, regressions 3 and 4). Before 1714, there is a clear trend away from using
collateral. If we simply use a usury dummy, we see a very large jump in the probability of
using some security. If we use an interaction term (Usury  Trend), we see that the
earlier trend actually reversed; after 1714, the use of collateral started to grow again.
15
Only mortgage lending appears unaffected by the change in the usury laws. They
continued to be larger than ordinary credits, and increased by 42% in value after 1714.
In the eyes of contemporaries, the economic implications were not benign. As Adam
Smith put it, [t]he only people to whom stock is commonly lent, without their being
Table 5
Lending to Select Customers, Before and After 1714
Aristocracy Minor Female Known Repeat customers N
proportion of number of loans
pre-1714 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.37 686
post-1714 0.13 0.21 0.05 0.16 0.48 191
retained customers 0.21 0.19 0.02 0.26 85
proportion of total lending
pre-1714 0.11 0.16 0.03 0.28 0.33 686
post-1714 0.16 0.21 0.01 0.33 0.43 191
retained customers 0.28 0.14 0.005 0.59 85
15 With non-linear models, the signiﬁcance of the interaction term cannot be determined by the z-statistic
on the multiplied variables (Norton et al., 2004). We checked using the inteff stata-routine for the signiﬁcance
of the interaction, which is high over the entire range of predicted values. Results are available from the
authors upon request. Note also that the South Sea bubble is not responsible for the increase in lending
against securities. The bank acted very cautiously in lending against shares in 1720, imposing a hefty haircut
compared to market value, and not lending at all against South Sea shares during the height of the bubble. If
we re-estimate regression 4 in Table 3 without the year 1720, we obtain a coefﬁcient of 1.14 (t-statistic 5.55) on
the usury dummy. The interaction term Usury  Trend drops to 0.25 (t-statistic 6.2); inteff conﬁrms its
signiﬁcance.
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upon mortgage (Smith, 1976 [1776]).
Defaults are crucial for our argument that the bank was trying to reduce risk in
response to the change in the usury laws. They were rare indeed. We can identify them
because they were ﬁnally repaid by selling the collateral (typically, jewellery) or by
transferring the loan to a partner. We found fewer than 15 such defaults in our period
for an aggregate value of £6,000, on which Hoare’s lost the interest but not often the
principal. We may have been unable to identify some defaults but we did not ﬁnd any
evidence that this was a major problem for the bank. Getting paid for its services,
however, was another story. The records do not indicate the fears of Hoare’s partners,
only the results of their actions. We argue that the partners broadly solved the problem
of risk, as the data show. We cannot know how intense their concern about it was.
Changing lending practices after 1714 may well have reduced default risk. Before
1713, there were 13 defaults. Afterwards, there were none. A Chi
2-Test shows that the
change in relative frequency is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. There is uncertainty sur-
rounding our classiﬁcation of defaults, and these results do not prove that risk-
reduction was the prime motivation for the bank. Yet the data suggest that the dramatic
changes in lending behaviour were partly intended to reduce defaults.
3.3. Alternative Interpretations
What other factors could account for the observed changes in lending behaviour? We
discuss ﬁve possible alternatives – reduced government borrowing, shifts in macro-
economic conditions, the South Sea bubble, changes in general interest rates and the
Hoare family’s changing fortune.
The Wars of the Spanish Succession ended in 1713. While they were fought, the
English state borrowed heavily, and crowding out may have been substantial (Wil-
liamson, 1984; Temin and Voth, 2005). Could it be that less government borrowing led
to a fall in the market interest rate – with the usury rate merely following? This is
implausible. First, the growth of public debt was also almost identical before and after
the war – the period 1702–13 saw an increase in debt by £1.7 million and the years
1714–24 registered a rise of £1.5 million.
16 Therefore, even if crowding out of private
investment was an important factor overall, the change in the usury rate was probably
Table 6
Collateralised and Uncollateralised Lending
1690–99 1700–04 1705–09 1710–14 1715–24
By number of loans No collateral 43 161 174 102 118
26.7% 54.8% 72.2% 87.9% 57.0%
Collateralised 118 133 67 14 89
73.3% 45.2% 27.8% 12.1% 43.0%
By value No collateral 17,326 135,086 101,447 85,684 90,822
25.1% 54.6% 58.0% 89.5% 32.5%
Collateralised 51,739 112,312 73,434 10,054 188,435
74.9% 45.4% 42.0% 10.5% 67.5%
16 Mitchell (1971, p. 600).
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countervailing any effect. Finally, differences in minimum loan size and social com-
position between the two periods are unlikely to have been caused by reduced state
borrowing (Williamson, 1984).
Also, the periods 1702–1713 and 1714–1725 are broadly comparable in macro-
economic terms. Differences in business cycle conditions are not responsible for the
changes we ﬁnd. Ashton’s classiﬁcation of business cycles suggests two peaks during the
ﬁrst period from 1702–1713, while the second registered three. Periods of crisis also
occurred twice during the ﬁrst period and three times in the second (Ashton, 1959).
The change in the usury laws was not driven by a general decline in market interest
rates.
17 While Sussman and Yafeh (2002) ﬁnd that their measure of interest rates fell
from 6.1% in 1708 to 4.2% in 1713, this was not different from earlier ﬂuctuations – the
rate also fell from 6.1% in 1702 to 4.5% in 1705. Yet the usury rate was adjusted
downwards only on the second occasion, not on the ﬁrst. This suggests that the gov-
ernment decided to lock in the lower rates permanently on the second occasion,
perhaps to guard against possible future increases.
Finally, we might wonder if the social climbing of Richard Hoare (and not the usury
laws) was responsible for the gentriﬁcation of the bank’s customers. Richard repre-
sented the City of London in Parliament from 1709 to 1713 and, in 1712, was elected
Lord Mayor of London. He received a knighthood shortly after the accession of Queen
Anne (Hoare, 1932). We cannot rule out that the accumulation of these honours made
it easier to gain blue-blooded clients. Yet if this was the key reason behind the shift in
loan allocation, we should see a gradual transition. Neither in the case of returns to
being known, nor minimum loan size, nor in the collateralisation do we see a slow
shift. Also, Sir Richard died in 1718, and his son Henry was not as successful at climbing
the rungs of Hanoverian England’s social hierarchy – he did not even receive a
knighthood. Only during ﬁve years (out of 12) in the second period could Sir Richard’s
connections have inﬂuenced the bank’s lending directly. Finally, if Sir Richard felt that
noblemen made better customers throughout, there is no obvious reason why he
should have lent to commoners and less well-connected individuals before 1713.
4. Conclusions
In this case study of a single goldsmith’s bank, Hoare’s, we document the effects of a
change in the usury laws that lowered the maximum permissible rate to 5%. Our results
indicate that the bank reacted aggressively to the new regulation. Interest rates charged
fell immediately. Also, the bank only engaged in the safest transactions. It successfully
avoided defaults, reducing them from already very low levels before the change in the
usury laws to zero. Hoare’s achieved this by lending only to the most attractive bor-
rowers. In eighteenth-century Britain, these were overwhelmingly of high birth or had
important connections in the political elite. The change in the usury law therefore had
redistributive effects.
18 The Glaeser and Scheinkman rationale for usury laws receives
17 This is the argument in North and Weingast (1989).
18 This echoes the recent ﬁndings by Braggion (2005), who found evidence that access to credit in Vic-
torian England was much easier for ﬁrms that had titled directors.
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did not produce social insurance.
Combined with other changes that followed the tightening of the usury laws,
developments at Hoare’s suggest that this regulation may have had a negative impact
on Britain’s banking system. Hoare’s resumed collateralised lending to minimise risks,
focusing on liquidity services for the upper classes. In contrast to the North and
Weingast’s (1989) argument, the lower maximum interest rate may not have simply
been a reﬂection of falling market rates. The very fact that we see sharp changes in
lending behaviour speaks against this. It is important to note that the bank eventually
managed to return to growth despite the usury laws – steady growth began some
15 years later, when general economic and population growth as well as a run of good
harvests provided a favourable environment. Adapting to the new environment
required drastic changes in lending practices.
19 We know little about the many banks
operating in the 1710s that did not survive. It may well be that Hoare’s was one of the
few institutions whose blue-blooded customer list allowed it to adopt decisive, com-
pensating measures to make banking proﬁtable despite a maximum interest rate of 5%
(Joslin, 1954).
Did the usury laws have an impact on the economy? The fact that intermediated
ﬁnance apparently only played a limited role in the Industrial Revolution has
continued to puzzle scholars. Britain generated enormous savings in the eighteenth
century. The ratio of debt to GDP surged to over 200% by 1815, mostly in the form
of government debt. At the same time, capital employed in the private sectors was
scarce throughout the period.
20 Given the changes at Hoare’s bank after 1714, it is
less surprising that little intermediated ﬁnance for business ventures existed.
21
Normal banks found it difﬁcult to take the risk of loaning to potentially useful and
proﬁtable commercial and industrial projects. Riskier projects were effectively shut
out of the loan market by the usury laws. An incumbent bank like Hoare’s with
high-level contacts managed to grow despite the usury laws, yet the drastic changes
it undertook suggest that dealing with a reduction in maximum interest chargeable
was no easy matter.
What little credit there was in an environment with loan restrictions largely ended up
in the hands of the nobility, often against mortgages – the least useful form of lending,
in Adam Smith’s view. Combined with massive public borrowing and existing restric-
tions on the formation of joint-stock companies as a result of the Bubble Act of 1720,
there is evidence of what development economists call ﬁnancial repression. Instead of
private and public credit growing in tandem, the tightening of the usury laws may have
hindered private-sector-led ﬁnancial deepening, even while it facilitated massive, war-
induced borrowing. If the changes in lending practice at Hoare’s Bank are found to be
representative of trends in the banking system elsewhere, Panglossian assessments of
the ﬁnancial revolution will have to be rewritten (Dickson, 1967).
19 We also examined if aggregate lending volume (or growth) had a systematic effect on the distribution of
lending, and found no evidence for this hypothesis.
20 Calculations by Allen (2005) show that marginal rates of return on capital surged to over 22% in England
over the time. The work by Stokey (2001) implies similar orders of magnitude.
21 Brunt (2005) argues that some country banks acted as venture capitalists.
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